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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and 
activists have supported policies to eliminate disparities in access to 
healthy food and, by doing so, reduce diet-related chronic diseases.  
These efforts have involved a wide range of interventions, from the 
creation of new farmers’ markets to programs encouraging 
convenience stores to sell fresh produce.  One of the most prominent 
food access interventions uses incentives to lure supermarkets to so-
called “food deserts,” communities deemed to have insufficient full-
service food retail.1  Federal, state, and municipal governments have 
invested hundreds of millions of dollars to subsidize supermarket 
development through such programs.2  However, research has shown 
that merely expanding access to food retail has no appreciable effect 
on shopping patterns, food choices, health, obesity, or diet-related 
diseases.3  Support for these interventions has nonetheless continued 
to grow—obscuring underlying issues and detracting from more 
effective strategies. 
This Article examines the emergence of food access as a policy 
issue, current approaches to increasing food access, and possible 
alternatives.  Part I discusses the development of the current food 
access narrative, focusing on its appeal to policymakers, urban 
planners, and public health officials.  Part II describes policies to 
increase access to food retail.  Part III reviews research on the 
relationship between food retail and health outcomes.  Part IV 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Part I.  The first large-scale intervention of this type in the United 
States was the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, which used over $145 
million in loans and grants to finance eighty-eight retail projects between 2004 and 
2010. THE FOOD TRUST, HEALTHY FOOD ACCESS IN PENNSYLVANIA: BUILDING ON 
SUCCESS, REINVESTING IN COMMUNITIES, CREATING JOBS 2 (2015).  In 2010, 
President Obama created a multi-agency federal program modeled after the 
Pennsylvania initiative. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama 
Administration Details Healthy Food Financing Initiative (Feb. 19, 2010), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg555.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GJJ7-Q5RG].  The Obama administration pledged to commit more 
than $400 million to the new program, called the Healthy Food Financing Initiative 
(“HFFI”). Id.  Several states and municipalities have also created similar initiatives to 
expand supermarket development, often using seed capital from HFFI. 
Memorandum from the 6th Annual Convening on Healthy Food Access: HFFI 
Messaging and Talking Points (May 3, 2017), http://www.healthyfoodaccess.org/
sites/default/files/HFFI%20TPs%202017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FTA-NNCZ]. 
 2. See infra Part II.  The federal government alone has distributed more than 
$500 million through the HFFI. Brian Elbel et al., Assessment of a Government-
Subsidized Supermarket in a High-Need Area on Household Food Availability and 
Children’s Dietary Intakes, 18 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2881, 2882 (2015). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
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examines why increasing food access persists as a policy goal despite 
its demonstrated failure to reduce health inequities.  Finally, Part V 
proposes alternative strategies for reducing economic and health 
disparities within food systems. 
I.  THE FOOD ACCESS NARRATIVE 
The concept of food access was originally applied to dynamics 
within developing countries with severely malnourished populations.4  
It was meant to reorient anti-hunger efforts away from a simplistic 
focus on food availability—the physical supply of food—toward one 
that also considered the ability of people to secure, or access, that 
food.5  By the late 1970s, recognizing that the Green Revolution 
failed to end famines and malnourishment despite increasing 
agricultural yields,6 food security scholars and practitioners 
increasingly emphasized the need to match food availability with food 
access.7  Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen popularized the 
concept of food access in the early 1980s, demonstrating that famines 
were not the result of insufficient food availability, but rather of 
policies dictating how people acquired and controlled food, which 
often deprived the poor of the means to access otherwise plentiful 
food supplies.8  Conventional forms of food assistance, which focused 
on distributing surplus food to impoverished countries, were 
challenged for perpetuating dependency on donor countries.9  A 1986 
                                                                                                                 
 4. This Article focuses on the narrative of “food access” as used and applied in 
the Global North.  There remains a distinct literature on access to food in developing 
countries that is grounded in different methodologies and concerns, and accordingly 
offers a different set of interventions. 
 5. Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Food Security: Definition and Measurement, 1 FOOD 
SECURITY 5, 5 (2009). 
 6. The Green Revolution, which lasted between 1966 and 1985, tripled the 
production of cereal crops—with only a thirty percent increase in land area 
cultivated—through substantial public expenditures on agricultural research, 
technology, and infrastructure. Prabhu L. Pingali, Green Revolution: Impacts, Limits, 
and the Path Ahead, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12302, 12302 (2012). 
 7. Id.  Writing in 1977, for example, the development scholar Peter Timmer 
argued for increased research on the dynamics of food access in order to understand 
why “the hungriest parts of the population” of “poor countries” remained 
malnourished despite the Green Revolution. C. Peter Timmer, Access to Food: The 
Ultimate Determinant of Hunger, 300 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 59, 60–61 (1977). 
 8. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION 1–8 (1981). 
 9. Anne C. Bellows & Michael W. Hamm, International Effects on and 
Inspiration for Community Food Security Policies and Practices in the USA, 
13 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 107, 111 (2003). 
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World Bank report on food security in developing countries 
summarized the new conventional wisdom: 
The world has ample food.  The growth of global food production 
has been faster than the unprecedented population growth of the 
past forty years. . . . Yet many poor countries and hundreds of 
millions of poor people do not share in this abundance.  They suffer 
from a lack of food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing 
power.10 
The report defined “food security” as “access by all people at all 
times to enough food for an active, healthy life” and “food insecurity” 
as “the lack of access to enough food.”11 
A. Third Way Politics and Food Access 
By the early 1990s, policymakers and social movements in the 
Global North began to focus on food access within their own 
countries.  Tony Blair’s government in the United Kingdom played a 
critical role in shaping discourse on food access in Europe and North 
America by emphasizing the availability of conventional food 
retailers to the exclusion of other factors.  “Improved access” quickly 
became defined as “improved access to food retail”—despite the 
emergence of social movements that sought to address food 
disparities in a more comprehensive way.12  Food insecurity in 
advanced economies thus became framed as a market failure that 
could be addressed, it was believed, through incentives for, and 
private-public partnerships with, food retailers.13  This narrative 
                                                                                                                 
 10. WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR FOOD 
SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1986), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/166331467990005748/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EJB-ZWLD]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The environmental justice movement, for example, called for both distributive 
and procedural equity in all aspects of the environment, including food systems. See 
Robert Gottlieb & Andrew Fisher, Community Food Security and Environmental 
Justice: Searching for a Common Discourse, 3 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 23, 23–25 
(1996).  The community food security movement, which grew to prominence in the 
mid-1990s, sought to accomplish long-term food security that included adequate 
income, food quality and cultural appropriateness, affordability, and sustainability. 
 13. The first major publicly-funded program in the United States to incentivize 
supermarket development was spurred, in part, by a 2001 campaign by The Food 
Trust called “Food for Every Child,” which sought to address dietary disparities 
exclusively through expanded access to food retail. See THE FOOD TRUST, SPECIAL 
REPORT: THE NEED FOR MORE SUPERMARKETS IN PHILADELPHIA 1 (2001).  As part 
of the campaign, The Food Trust released a report arguing that market failure had 
left lower-income neighborhoods bereft of supermarkets, resulting in significant 
disparities in nutrition and diet-related disease. Id. at 1, 6.  Their solution was simple: 
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proved particularly attractive to municipal policymakers, who sought 
to entice investors back into capital-starved cities, and public health 
officials, who were eager to identify environmental factors in the 
emerging obesity “epidemic.”  The concept of food access, which Sen 
had used to explain that poverty and property entitlements were the 
root causes of food insecurity, had, by the late 1990s, been recast in 
such a way so as to obscure those very issues. 
Tony Blair won a commanding majority in the United Kingdom’s 
1997 general election, bringing Labour to power for the first time in 
eighteen years.  Like Bill Clinton, his ideological counterpart in the 
United States, Blair rejected wealth redistribution, government 
intervention in markets, and increased public spending as outmoded 
ideological solutions.14  Branding his politics as the “Third Way”—
between conservative Tories and the “hard left”—Blair portrayed 
himself as a pragmatist capable of achieving progressive outcomes 
through private sector growth, public-private partnerships, and 
policies that encouraged individual responsibility and opportunity.15  
“What counts,” Blair emphasized during the election, is not 
“outdated ideology,” but “what works.”16 
Blair had seized on the growing health divide between the rich and 
poor as a campaign issue and promised to make reducing health 
inequalities a central goal of his new government.17  Blair appointed 
                                                                                                                 
state and local governments must “take the lead in developing a public-private 
response” and “invest in supermarket development.” Id. at 1. 
 14. See Curtis Atkins, The Third Way International, JACOBIN MAG. (Feb. 11, 
2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/atkins-dlc-third-way-clinton-blair-
schroeder-social-democracy [https://perma.cc/JT8D-6MAW].  While Bill Clinton did 
not take up food access as a major issue during his presidency, many of his fellow 
centrist “New Democrats” were major proponents of market-based food access 
interventions during the Obama administration. See generally, e.g., JOEL BERG, 
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., GOOD FOOD, GOOD JOBS: TURNING FOOD DESERTS INTO 
JOBS OASES (2010), http://www.progressivefix.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/PPI-
Policy-Report_BERG-Good-Food-Good-Jobs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XRJ-TT9V]. 
 15. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY 65 (1998) (suggesting “no rights without responsibilities” as a “prime 
motto” for the movement); Atkins, supra note 14; Patrick Butler, Public-Private 
Partnerships: The Issue Explained, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2001, 10:55 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2001/jun/25/ppp1 [https://perma.cc/XTA5-
GEVA] (discussing New Labour’s affinity for public-private partnerships). 
 16. Tim Harford, In Praise of Pragmatism, INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2011, 11:00 
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/in-praise-of-pragmatism-229
3820.html [https://perma.cc/Y8H3-84LS]; see THE LABOUR PARTY, NEW LABOUR 
BECAUSE BRITAIN DESERVES BETTER (1997). 
 17. Mary Shaw et al., Health Inequalities and New Labour: How the Promises 
Compare with Real Progress, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 1016, 1016 (2005); see also 
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Tessa Jowell as his public health minister and established an 
Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health led by the National 
Health Services’ former chief medical officer, Sir Donald Acheson.18  
Both Jowell and the Acheson Inquiry identified the proliferation of 
so-called “food deserts,” communities with insufficient healthy food 
retail, as a major problem and advocated for improving food access as 
the solution.19  While the phrase “food desert” was first used in the 
early 1990s by public housing residents in Scotland,20 the term was 
included in a U.K. government report published in 1995, and the new 
Labour government popularized it, warning that food deserts were a 
“real problem” that gave rise to “virtually every major illness.”21  The 
British media repeated such claims, often uncritically,22 while funding 
for such research increased, resulting in a number of studies 
purporting, at least initially, to link limited food access with poor diet 
and health outcomes.23 
Food deserts appeared to be a problem perfectly suited to Blair’s 
Third Way approach.  By working with the private sector to expand 
food retail options, Labour promised a win-win for businesses and 
low-income residents.  “It’s the Third Way applied to shopping,” as 
one advocate told The Guardian in 1999, describing a pilot project to 
bring locally-owned corner stores to food deserts.24  While the corner 
                                                                                                                 
Michael G. Marmot, Tackling Health Inequalities Since the Acheson Inquiry, 58 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 262, 262 (2004). 
 18. RAY EARWICKER, Progress in Tackling Health Inequalities: A Policy Maker’s 
Reflections, in CHALLENGING HEALTH INEQUALITIES: FROM ACHESON TO 
‘CHOOSING HEALTH’ 17, 17 (Elizabeth Dowler & Nick Spencer eds., 2007). 
 19. ELIZABETH DOWLER, MARTIN CARAHER & PAUL LINCOLN, Inequalities in 
Food and Nutrition: Challenging ‘Lifestyles’, in CHALLENGING HEALTH 
INEQUALITIES: FROM ACHESON TO ‘CHOOSING HEALTH’, 127, 139 (Elizabeth Dowler 
& Nick Spencer eds., 2007). 
 20. Steven Cummins et al., “Food Deserts”—Evidence and Assumption in Health 
Policy Making, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 436, 436 (2002). 
 21. Valerie Elliott, ‘Food Deserts’ Threaten Health of Poor and Old, TIMES, Nov. 
5, 1997, at 10. 
 22. See, e.g., id.; Martin Hickman, ‘Food Deserts’ Depriving Towns of Fresh 
Fruits and Vegetables, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 13, 2007, at 12; Geraint Smith, Parents 
Expected to Outlive Children as Obesity Spreads, EVENING STANDARD, Sept. 9, 
2002, at 15. 
 23. See Steven Cummins et al., Large Scale Food Retailing as an Intervention for 
Diet and Health: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of a Natural Experiment, 59 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY COMMUNITY HEALTH 1035 (2005) (providing a literature review of 
early studies). 
 24. Martin Wainwright, Fresh Fruit and Veg Herald a Fresh Start for the Corner 
Stop, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 1999), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/02/martinwainwright 
[https://perma.cc/8KSF-LN6Q]. 
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store pilot program garnered positive press, supermarkets were the 
main beneficiaries of the push to expand food retail options.  In late 
1999, for example, large grocery chain Tesco announced a partnership 
with Blair’s “New Deal” welfare to work program to create two 
thousand jobs by building new stores in food deserts,25 which became 
part of Tesco’s broader strategy to expand in low-income and 
depressed areas through “regeneration partnerships” with local 
organizations and authorities.26  Tesco’s promise to revitalize food 
deserts helped propel its rapid growth: between 1990 and 2005 its 
market share in the United Kingdom nearly doubled, jumping from 
sixteen to thirty percent.27 
B. The Emergence of Food Access in the United States 
In the 1990s, researchers and policymakers in the United States 
increasingly focused on the ability of individuals to purchase food 
through conventional distribution channels.28  Although activist 
groups had addressed hunger and malnourishment for decades,29 
advocates in the United States increased their efforts to improve food 
access.  Government cuts to welfare and food assistance programs, as 
well as economic restructuring, had rapidly increased food 
insecurity.30  The rise in food insecure populations consequently 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Lucy Baker, Tesco in Partnership Deal to Create 2,000 Jobs in Most Deprived 
Areas, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 18, 1999), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tesco-in-partnership-deal-to-
create-2000-jobs-in-most-deprived-areas-740510.html [https://perma.cc/V8Q2-
UC3Q]. 
 26. See Steven Cummins et al., Healthy Cities: The Impact of Food Retail-Led 
Regeneration on Food Access, Choice and Retail Structure, 31 BUILT ENV’T. 288, 289 
(2005) (describing Tesco’s “particularly active” ‘regeneration’ strategy); see also 
Judith Nelson, See How Our Regeneration Partnership Scheme Helps People Back 
into Work, TESCO (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ourtesco.com/2012/03/29/946/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NPV-4BAK] (advertising the opening of Tesco’s forty-second 
“Regeneration Partnership” store since 2000). 
 27. See U.K. % Market Share of Supermarkets - Groceries Market, 
FOODDESERTS.ORG [hereinafter U.K. Market Share], 
http://www.fooddeserts.org/images/supshare.htm [https://perma.cc/EFQ8-329Q]. 
 28. See, e.g., Barbara E. Cohen, Food Security and Hunger Policy for the 1990s, 
25 NUTRITION TODAY 23, 25 (1990). 
 29. See, e.g., GARRET BROAD, MORE THAN JUST FOOD: FOOD JUSTICE AND 
COMMUNITY CHANGE 131–46 (2016) (discussing the Black Panther Party’s food 
programs); Janet Poppendieck, Hunger in America: Typification and Response, in 
EATING AGENDAS: FOOD AND NUTRITION AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 11–34 (Donna 
Maurer & Jeffery Sobal eds., 1995) (analyzing “discoveries” of hunger in the United 
States during the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s). 
 30. See Saskia Sassen, Economic Restructuring and the American City, 16 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 465, 466–67 (1990). 
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overwhelmed the nation’s emergency food system.31  At the same 
time, the migration of supermarkets and grocery stores away from 
low-income neighborhoods often made acquiring affordable food 
difficult for the urban poor.32  Newly emerging social movements, 
including the community food security and environmental justice 
movements, integrated the concept of food access into their own 
agendas and activism.33  In reports, academic articles, and advocacy 
materials, members of these movements broadened the notion to 
encompass equity and the entire food supply chain.34  Nonetheless, 
the policies and programs that emerged to improve access often used 
the narrower definition of food access that highlighted the availability 
of conventional food retail.35 
This limited definition appealed to urban policymakers and public 
health officials because it framed the problem of food insecurity and 
diet-related health disparities as a market failure that could be cured 
through policy interventions such as subsidies to for-profit food 
retailers.36  Access quickly came to be defined by “the presence of 
conventional food markets in low-income neighborhoods or close 
by.”37  It was not until the early 2000s, however, that U.S. 
organizations and researchers, following the U.K. model, began to 
systematically “document” food deserts and advocate for additional 
food retail. 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Between 1970 and 1986, the purchasing power of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (“AFDC”), the federal government’s main welfare program, 
declined by thirty-three percent. STAFF OF COMM. ON HUNGER, 100TH CONG., 
OBTAINING FOOD: SHOPPING CONSTRAINTS ON THE POOR 2 (Comm. Print 1987).  The 
amount of food distributed through the emergency food system increased from 25 
million pounds in 1979 to over 450 million pounds in 1990. LINDA ASHMAN ET AL., 
SEEDS OF CHANGE: STRATEGIES FOR FOOD SECURITY FOR THE INNER CITY 15 (1993). 
 32. See STAFF OF COMM. ON HUNGER, supra note 31, at 4. 
 33. See Robert Gottlieb & Andrew Fisher, “First Feed the Face”: Environmental 
Justice and Community Food Security, 28 ANTIPODE 193, 193 (1996); ROBERT 
GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 16–18 (rev. ed. 2005). 
 34. See Gottlieb & Fisher, supra note 33, at 200. 
 35. See, e.g., Renee E. Walker et al., Disparities and Access to Healthy Food in 
the United States: A Review of Food Deserts Literature, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 876, 
876 (2010). 
 36. The fact that supermarkets, for example, inaccurately gauged market demand 
was emphasized. Id. at 877. 
 37. Cohen, supra note 28, at 25. 
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C. Municipal Politics and Food Access 
Food access became politically salient in cities as elected officials, 
urban “growth coalitions,”38 the food retail sector, urban planners, 
and public health practitioners sought to reverse the loss of 
conventional food retailers from cities.39  Over the past century, 
policies of residential discrimination and segregation, bank redlining, 
urban renewal, federal highway construction, and federal housing 
policies prompted disinvestment in communities of color, 
exacerbating wealth inequality by shifting dollars to more affluent, 
white suburban communities.40  These policies facilitated the shift of 
chain supermarkets to the suburbs, and by underwriting the flight of 
middle class and affluent white residents from cities, led to the decline 
of the independent grocers that remained.41  In the 1970s, low income 
zip codes had more supermarkets than high income zip codes, but by 
the 1980s and 1990s this ratio had been reversed.42  Between 1970 and 
1988, Los Angeles, Chicago, and the New York City boroughs of 
Manhattan and Brooklyn lost half of their large grocery stores.43 
By the 1980s, however, cities began to reinvest in neighborhoods 
that had been neglected for decades.  City administrations and real 
estate developers recognized that new middle and high income 
residential projects depended on the presence of supermarkets (along 
with refurbished playgrounds, schools, and other amenities) to attract 
the affluent residents who were being enticed to move into (and 
gentrify) low-income neighborhoods, and that tax revenue was being 
lost as city residents spent food dollars in adjacent suburbs.44  By the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a 
Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). 
 39. See generally Kameshwari Pothukuchi, Attracting Supermarkets to Inner-City 
Neighborhoods: Economic Development Outside the Box, 19 ECON. DEV. Q. 232 
(2005). 
 40. See generally REBUILDING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS: ACHIEVEMENTS, 
OPPORTUNITIES, AND LIMITS (W. Dennis Keating & Norman Krumholz eds., 1999); 
David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of 
Racism and Discrimination, 896 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 173 (1999). 
 41.  Elizabeth Eisenhauer, In Poor Health: Supermarket Redlining and Urban 
Nutrition, 53 GEOJOURNAL 125, 126–27 (2001); Pothukuchi, supra note 39. 
 42. Jarrett Thibodeaux, A Historical Era of Food Deserts: Changes in the 
Correlates of Urban Supermarket Location, 1970–1990, 3 SOC. CURRENTS 186, 188, 
196–97 (2015). 
 43. Marilyn Lavin, Supermarket Access and Consumer Well-Being: The Case of 
Pathmark in Harlem, 33 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 388, 388 (2005). 
 44. See generally NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND 
THE REVANCHIST CITY (1996).  National retail and real estate studies provided 
evidence to support policies to attract food retail to cities by documenting unmet 
grocery demand and the “leakage” of inner-city food dollars to suburban stores. See 
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1990s, food retailers that had saturated suburban markets in the 1970s 
viewed cities as new business frontiers.45  Seizing this market 
opportunity, retailers reconfigured their business models and physical 
layouts to fit smaller spaces in gentrifying neighborhoods, often with 
the support of municipal officials.46 
D. Food Access and the “Obesity Epidemic” 
Food access was also positioned as a solution to the rising incidence 
of obesity, which was described in a 1985 report of the National 
Institutes of Health as a major public health threat.47  By 2001, the 
Surgeon General issued a “call to action” to decrease the incidence of 
overweight and obesity, which he said had reached “nationwide 
epidemic proportions.”48  Attention to obesity led academics, 
advocates, and policymakers to focus on measuring the problem, its 
causes, and potential solutions.  Research in public health and urban 
planning examined the relationship between food access and 
obesity.49  Aided by the wider availability of mapping software and 
increasing popularity of geospatial analysis, this research caused a 
proliferation of studies suggesting that the lack of healthy food was 
associated with obesity and diet-related diseases.50  The focus on food 
access coincided with a shift in public health towards framing the 
causes of obesity as the result of environmental factors, such as 
marketing practices and unhealthy food environments, rather than 
personal behavior and biology.51  Food access captured the 
imagination of progressive planners and public health practitioners in 
large part because it addressed food insecurity through a social 
ecological model emphasizing the neighborhood environment, 
including the physical availability of food retailers.52  It also appeared 
                                                                                                                 
also Michael E. Porter, New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development, 11 
ECON. DEV. Q. 11, 14 (1997). 
 45. Porter, supra note 44, at 14. 
 46. See Pothukuchi, supra note 39, at 234; Betsy Donald, Food Retail and Access 
After the Crash: Rethinking the Food Desert Problem, 13 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 231, 
235 (2013). 
 47. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF OBESITY 7 (1985). 
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO 
PREVENT ACTION AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, at v (2001). 
 49. Jerry Shannon, Food Deserts: Governing Obesity in the Neoliberal City, 
38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 248, 248–66 (2014). 
 50. Id. at 248–55. 
 51. Regina G. Lawrence, Framing Obesity: The Evolution of News Discourse on 
a Public Health Issue 56–75 (Harvard Int’l J. Press/Politics, Working Paper No. 2004-
5, 2004). 
 52. See Shannon, supra note 49, at 255. 
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to offer a politically feasible solution to a long-running problem.  The 
idea that government, working hand-in-hand with industry, could 
address diet-related health disparities through the expansion of retail 
grocery stores resonated in an era when policymakers increasingly 
viewed well-managed economic markets as the solution to social 
problems—and sought to transform the poor into “[self-reliant] 
market actors.”53 
II.  FOOD ACCESS POLICIES 
Federal, state, and local governments in the United States have 
long implemented a wide range of policies to provide access to food, 
from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) to 
school food, congregate meal programs for seniors, support for food 
pantries and emergency feeding programs, and other food assistance 
programs.  Governments have also facilitated various forms of private 
sector food retail access, from building public markets for food 
vendors during the Progressive Era to creating farmers’ markets in 
the 1970s.54  Most cities in the United States regulate grocers through 
zoning, building codes, and health regulations, and have used direct 
subsidies, publicly owned land, tax abatements, and zoning incentives 
to attract supermarkets.55  For much of the last century, however, 
urban planners and policymakers have considered food retail to be 
market driven and did not seek to directly subsidize grocers.56  This 
laissez-faire approach began to change in the 1990s as a result of 
several efforts to support the development of conventional food 
retailers in low-income communities.  It was not until the 2000s, 
however, that the new food access paradigm led to widespread policy 
change.  The perceived success of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food 
Financing Initiative, a public-private partnership started in 2004 to 
expand food retail in food deserts,57 as well as earlier developments in 
the United Kingdom, spurred substantial interest in retail-focused 
food access interventions among U.S. policymakers, philanthropists, 
and researchers. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM 
AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 22 (2011). 
 54. Gregory A. Donofrio, Feeding the City, 7 GASTRONOMICA 30, 35–39 (2007). 
 55. Pothukuchi, supra note 39, at 232. 
 56. See Kameshwari Pothukuchi & Jerome L. Kaufman, Placing the Food System 
on the Urban Agenda: The Role of Municipal Institutions in Food Systems Planning, 
16 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 213, 213–24 (1999). 
 57. See, e.g., Allison Karpyn et al., Policy Solutions to the ‘Grocery Gap,’ 29 
HEALTH AFF. 473, 473–80 (2010) (describing the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Initiative 
as a model for other state and national programs). 
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A. The Retail Initiative 
The Retail Initiative, an early effort to address food access 
concerns, was led by the Local Initiative Support Corporation 
(“LISC”), a national non-profit primarily involved in helping 
communities build affordable housing and commercial developments.  
In 1994, LISC created a $24 million fund financed by ten large 
financial institutions to help community organizations in major U.S. 
cities develop supermarkets in underserved neighborhoods.58  The 
initiative’s first project was to invest $1.5 million, along with $1.1 
million in public money and below-market city land, to build a large-
scale Pathmark supermarket in East Harlem, New York.59 
B. State and Local Fresh Food Financing Initiatives 
Most large programs to finance new supermarkets in low-income 
communities have been organized at the state level.  Expanding on 
the work of The Retail Initiative, in 2001, The Food Trust of 
Philadelphia advocated for improving supermarket access in low-
income Philadelphia communities, which the Philadelphia City 
Council responded to with the creation of a Food Marketing Task 
Force to address the insufficient number of supermarkets.60  This 
effort, in turn, led to a statewide supermarket campaign and the 
creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative in 2004 
to use New Market Tax Credits and philanthropic financing to 
incentivize supermarket developers to locate their stores in low-
income neighborhoods.61  Between 2004 and 2010, the Pennsylvania 
Fresh Food Financing Initiative provided $145 million in loans and 
grants to support eighty-eight food retail projects.62  The Food Trust 
eventually promoted its financing initiative outside of Pennsylvania, 
leading to the creation of similar programs in other states, including 
Ohio, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York.63  These efforts 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Marilyn Lavin, Problems and Opportunities of Retailing in the US “Inner 
City,” 7 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 47, 54 (2000).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Tracey Giang et al., Closing the Grocery Gap in Underserved Communities: 
The Creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, 14 J. PUB. 
HEALTH MGMT. & PRACTICE 272, 274 (2008). 
 61. See Karpyn et al., supra note 57, at 479–80. 
 62. THE FOOD TRUST, supra note 1, at 2. 
 63. Healthy Food Financing Programs Across the Country, FOOD TRUST, 
http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/media_items/healthy-food-financing-programs-
table.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3RX-VUS6]. See generally Laura Wolf-Powers, 
Food Deserts and Real-Estate-Led Social Policy, 41 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 
414 (2017). 
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also led to municipal policies in cities like New Orleans and New 
York City to provide financial and zoning incentives to spur 
supermarket development.64 
C. Federal Healthy Food Financing Initiative 
The proliferation of state and local healthy food financing 
initiatives encouraged President Obama to create a federal version of 
the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative in 2010, called the 
Healthy Food Financing Initiative (“HFFI”), which was subsequently 
included in the 2014 Farm Bill.65  In addition to bolstering his 
administration’s efforts to improve nutrition and reduce obesity, 
HFFI was designed to spur local economic development in the wake 
of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.66  Like the state financing 
initiatives, the federal program supported the development and 
expansion of supermarkets and other full service grocery stores in 
low-income neighborhoods under-served by food retailers, 
distributing more than $500 million in new and existing funds from 
the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture (“USDA”) and Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”).67  The HFFI, combined with state and 
local programs, has supported approximately 126 new supermarket 
projects.68 
D. Advocacy, Philanthropic, and Research Support 
Healthy food financing policies spread rapidly in large part due to 
the efforts of advocacy organizations, funders, and academics.  The 
Pennsylvania Food Financing Initiative, for example, was developed 
with a broad coalition of advocates, public health officials, and private 
and non-profit development interests.69  Think tanks such as 
PolicyLink issued reports describing both the dearth of supermarkets 
                                                                                                                 
 64. SARAH TREUHAFT & ALLISON KARPYN, THE GROCERY GAP: WHO HAS 
ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS, POLICYLINK & THE FOOD TRUST 
22 (2010). 
 65. Wolf-Powers, supra note 63, at 418; see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 6953 (West 2017). 
 66. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 1 (noting that the initiative was part of 
a broader effort by the administration to promote economic recovery). 
 67. Elbel et al., supra note 2, at 2882; see also Heather Tirado Gilligan, Food 
Deserts Aren’t the Problem, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/
food/2014/02/food_deserts_and_fresh_food_access_aren_t_the_problem_poverty_not
_obesity.html [https://perma.cc/Q6V8-RZJS] (examining HFFI’s effectiveness). 
 68. Benjamin W. Chrisinger, Taking Stock of New Supermarkets in Food Deserts: 
Patterns in Development, Financing, and Health Promotion 1, 4–5 (Fed. Res. Bank 
of S.F., Working Paper 2016-04). 
 69. Giang et al., supra note 60, at 272. 
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in low-income communities and the connection between insufficient 
food retail and diet-related diseases.70 
Philanthropic organizations also supported these initiatives by 
underwriting incentive programs and the evaluation of their impacts.  
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, for example, invested $12 
million in New Jersey’s Food Access Initiative.71  The Kellogg 
Foundation provided $3 million in partnership with NCB Capital 
Impact to fund several food access ventures.72  The California 
Endowment made a $30 million investment in the California 
FreshWorks Fund to finance healthy food retailers.73  The 
Reinvestment Fund created a $120 million financing program for 
fresh food retail establishments.74  This philanthropic and advocacy 
support helped to reinforce the link between supermarkets and food 
access, nutrition, and health. 
Government and academic research was also instrumental in 
framing the issue of malnourishment and obesity in terms of retail 
food access by generating data that policymakers used to design and 
implement food access programs.  For example, in the 2008 Farm Bill, 
Congress required the USDA to study the causes, effects, and 
strategies to eliminate food deserts that included “incentives for retail 
food market development, including supermarkets, small grocery 
stores, and farmers’ markets . . . .”75  Despite raising questions about 
the use of supermarkets and proximity as measures of access,76 the 
USDA nevertheless created an online Food Access Research Atlas 
that defined food deserts as areas lacking full-service food retailers, 
framing the problem of food access in terms of the spatial distribution 
of supermarkets.77 
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 71. Philanthropy News Digest, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Pledges $12 
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 74. IRA GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE REINVESTMENT FUND, CDFI FINANCING OF 
SUPERMARKETS IN UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY 5 (2008). 
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supercenter, or large grocery store (‘supermarket’ for short).” Documentation, U.S. 
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The federal government funded additional food access research 
and planning through the Communities Putting Prevention to Work 
national grant program (“CPPW”).  This program was administered 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and in 
2010 provided over $400 million to fifty communities, including many 
large cities, to implement “policy, systems, and environmental” 
interventions to reduce obesity and diet-related health problems.78  
Many of these grants financed food systems research and planning 
projects that focused attention on increasing access to healthier food, 
and approximately half of the grant recipients developed 
interventions to enhance access to healthy food retail or healthier 
retail food.79 
Academic researchers have continued to focus on the geospatial 
distribution of food retailers, attempting to find associations between 
access and health outcomes.  Many of these studies have analyzed 
spatial disparities in access to healthy food and how these disparities 
could affect an individual’s health.80  Much of this food access 
research has attempted to measure the impacts of food deserts on 
diet-related diseases and the effects of new food retailers on food 
choices and health outcomes.81  This research has typically analyzed 
the proximity and density of “retail food outlets” in communities, 
frequently using supermarkets as proxies for access to healthy, 
affordable food.82  In supporting and carrying out this research, 
funders and academics have helped to perpetuate the theory that 
access to supermarkets is a critical factor in health disparities. 
As this section has shown, local, state, and federal policies have 
been implemented to support the development of new supermarkets 
based on assumptions that they improve access to healthy food and 
thus address malnourishment and diet-related diseases.  The narrative 
underlying such policies—that communities with insufficient food 
retail will become healthier as a result of new supermarkets—has 
                                                                                                                 
DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-
access-research-atlas/documentation [https://perma.cc/S4ZC-ZE6P]. 
 78. Rebecca Bunnell et al., Fifty Communities Putting Prevention to Work: 
Accelerating Chronic Disease Prevention Through Policy, Systems and 
Environmental Change, 37 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 1081, 1081–82 (2012). 
 79. Id.  For example, Cook County, Illinois used these funds to create a program 
to encourage corner stores to sell healthier food. See Latetia Moore, Supporting 
Healthful Eating Through Retail Environmental Change: Communities Putting 
Prevention to Work, 10 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, No. E189, Nov. 2013, at 2. 
 80. Shannon, supra note 49, at 248. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 255. 
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been reinforced by food advocates, philanthropic organizations, the 
USDA, and research aimed at testing this relationship.  However, as 
the following section illustrates, researchers have found little 
empirical evidence to support the theory that new supermarkets lead 
to improved health. 
III.  LIMITATIONS OF RETAIL FOOD ACCESS POLICIES 
When the Blair government first popularized the phrase “food 
desert” in the late 1990s and claimed, prematurely, that food deserts 
were responsible for major health disparities, research on the effects 
of food access in advanced economies was in its infancy.  Early 
research suggested a link between proximity to food retailers and 
healthier eating, and advocates for food access interventions 
summarized these studies to support supermarket incentive 
programs.83  A 2013 report by PolicyLink and the Food Trust, for 
example, asserted that “[l]iving closer to healthy food retail is 
associated with better eating habits and decreased risk for obesity and 
diet-related diseases.”84 
However, more recent research suggests that there is little to no 
relationship between proximity to retailers of healthy food and 
increased purchasing or consumption of healthy food.85  A 2016 study 
using store-level sales data not only looked at whether people lived 
near retail food stores, but also tracked what products those stores 
carried and what store customers purchased.86  The study, which was 
the first of its kind, found that physical proximity to retail food stores 
with nutritious food accounted for less than 3% of the nutrition gap 
between low-income and high-income households.87  A systematic 
review of forty-two studies of retail grocery store interventions 
designed to promote healthier food consumption, including 
interventions that coupled new food retail with programs like 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See, e.g., JUDITH BELL ET AL., POLICYLINK & THE FOOD TRUST, ACCESS TO 
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 84. Id. at 12. 
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nutrition education and discounts for fruits and vegetables, found 
mixed results.88  A review of fifty-one studies examining the 
relationship between obesity and the presence of food retailers, 
proximity to stores, and the number and types of stores within given 
areas, found that only 32% of associations were in the expected 
direction, 10% were in the opposite direction, and 58% showed no 
association.89  Furthermore, recent studies measuring the impact of a 
new supermarket on residents of underserved communities have also 
shown no significant change in food buying or eating patterns.90  For 
example, while a new supermarket in Philadelphia, financed by the 
Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, improved residents’ 
perceptions of food access, it did not lead to reported increased 
consumption of fruits and vegetables or decreases in body mass 
indexes.91  A quasi-experimental study in Pittsburgh found similar 
results: significant improvements in perceptions of healthy food 
access but no significant changes in food buying practices.92  Another 
study found that a year after the opening of a new supermarket in an 
underserved South Bronx neighborhood, residents reported no 
significant change in fruit or vegetable consumption or overall dietary 
quality compared to a control community.93  These studies indicate 
that new supermarkets may improve perceptions of healthy food 
access but do not appear to change shopping and buying practices, 
and that supermarkets, which sell both unhealthy and healthy 
products, do not necessarily change the balance of unhealthy and 
healthy items purchased and consumed.  Other studies have found 
inconsistent relationships between proximity to supermarkets and 
measures of food insecurity.94 
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While the majority of high-quality studies examining the 
relationship between healthy food retail and health outcomes have 
not found an association between the two, proponents of food access 
interventions nonetheless continue to rely on the minority of studies 
showing such a connection.95  This has important policy implications.  
As long as governments and activists continue to assert that access to 
food retail is a determinant of healthy food purchasing, diets, and 
health, initiatives to address the financial and logistical obstacles to 
healthy food consumption will be more difficult to advance.  The food 
access narrative persists—despite increasing evidence to the 
contrary—for several reasons outlined in the following section. 
IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF RETAIL FOOD ACCESS POLICIES 
National food access programs like the Healthy Food Financing 
Initiative and local policies like New York City’s Food Retail 
Expansion to Support Health still retain considerable support.  In 
fact, many policymakers and nonprofit organizations continue to 
advocate for more aggressive funding for food retail-focused 
interventions.  A bipartisan group of four U.S. senators, for example, 
introduced a bill in 2017,96 which they claimed would “target food 
deserts by incentivizing food service providers . . . to help eradicate 
these areas.”97  The bill, dubbed the Healthy Food Access for All 
Americans Act, was endorsed by a wide range of groups, including 
Feeding America, the Food Trust, the American Diabetes 
Association, Environmental Working Group, the National Grocers 
Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.98  Three factors help 
explain the appeal of such interventions despite overwhelming 
evidence that they fail to improve health or dietary outcomes: self-
promotion by food retailers, the political appeal of supermarket 
development, and analytical weaknesses. 
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A. Self-Promotion by Food Retailers 
The supermarket industry, long criticized for price-gouging low-
income consumers and abandoning cities for the suburbs, successfully 
repositioned itself as key to urban revitalization and community 
health in the 1990s and early 2000s.  The industry portrayed itself as 
ready and able to open new, redesigned, small-footprint grocery 
stores in underserved communities at a scale that independent grocers 
could not match, enabling these chains to secure public subsidies.99  
Tesco, for example, the fastest growing food retailer in terms of 
market share in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2005 (nearly 
doubling its market share from approximately sixteen percent to 
approximately thirty percent),100 capitalized on concerns about food 
deserts to garner positive press and win over government officials.  As 
discussed above, the company announced a partnership with Blair’s 
“New Deal” welfare-to-work program in 1999 to create two thousand 
jobs in new stores in “towns that were previously labelled ‘food 
deserts.’”101  By investing in “inner cities and industrial towns” with 
limited retail food options, Tesco promised to regenerate poor 
neighborhoods while bringing jobs and food to areas which had 
previously been known as food deserts.102  Tesco was also able to 
deflect criticism that its stores (which, like Walmart, carry a variety of 
non-food products), would put locally-owned, independent shops out 
of business by emphasizing the benefits they would create by 
increasing food access.103 
When Tesco expanded to the United States in 2006, they seized on 
food access as their primary public relations strategy, telling 
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journalists, politicians, and the public that their new chain, Fresh & 
Easy, would bring fresh food and groceries to food deserts, leading to 
news headlines like “Tesco launch stirs high hopes in U.S. ‘food 
deserts.’”104  Tesco’s head of operations in the United States, Tim 
Mason, told the Observer, “[o]ne of the reasons we appeal to 
American politicians is because we have said we will go back into 
neighborhoods that have become ‘food deserts.’”105  Yet despite 
Tesco’s pledge, only ten of its first ninety-eight U.S. stores were 
located in areas where the poverty rate was significantly higher than 
that of the relevant county (notably, the data indicates that Tesco 
“has generally established its sites in areas with greater rather than 
lesser food security”).106  In fact, at the outset, Tesco focused on 
“middle-income customers and suburban locations” with a 
comparable “store size, price, and to a certain extent product mix” as 
Trader Joe’s.107  Even if Fresh & Easy stores had opened in food 
deserts, their presence would likely have been short-lived: Tesco 
announced that it was withdrawing from the U.S. market in 2012, and 
the last Fresh & Easy was scheduled to close in 2015.108 
Like Tesco, Walmart, which relied on physically large “big box” 
retail stores since its inception, saw a business opportunity in small-
format urban and small town stores to address saturation in existing 
locations.  In August 2008, Walmart created a new small-format store, 
which it branded “Marketside,” to compete primarily with Fresh & 
Easy.109  Walmart closed its four Marketside stores just three years 
later, announcing the creation of another small-store format called 
Walmart Express.110  In 2011, Walmart experienced one of its worst 
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slumps in U.S. sales.111  That year, Walmart promised that Walmart 
Express would allow the retailer to expand into urban areas and rural 
towns that couldn’t support larger stores, and would therefore 
increase access to healthy food.112 
The month following the opening of the first Walmart Express in 
Gentry, Arkansas, First Lady Michelle Obama announced a plan by 
Walmart, along with Walgreens, SuperValu, and three regional 
chains, to open or expand 1500 stores in food deserts across the 
country.113  The supermarket and pharmacy chains received positive 
press for this agreement, yet there was little to no news coverage 
when they failed to meet their commitments.114  A 2013 investigation 
found that Walgreens still needed to build or convert about 900 of the 
stores they had committed to build or renovate in food deserts.115  In 
2015, Walgreens claimed that it had started to offer fruits and 
vegetables in 300 stores “in or around food deserts,” but this claim 
was never independently evaluated and the chain never revealed if it 
had made any additional progress.116  While Walmart claimed to open 
or renovate 392 stores in or around food deserts by 2016, exceeding 
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(on file with author) (providing helpful context to the proposition which the 
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its commitment by 117 stores,117 it abandoned its Express concept 
later that year, closing 154 stores in the United States, many of them 
in food deserts.118 
B. Political Appeal of Supermarket Development 
New supermarkets are politically appealing to city elected officials 
attempting to increase residential development in low-income 
communities because they are favored by developers and more 
affluent residents.  In justifying New York City’s FRESH initiative, 
for example, the former New York City Planning Commissioner 
stressed the importance of supermarkets to the city’s redevelopment 
plans, claiming: 
If you’re thinking of moving your family to the Lower Concourse [a 
large manufacturing area in the South Bronx that the commission 
rezoned to include residential buildings] you’re going to say, like, 
“Wow, there is no grocery store here.  I’m not going to move 
here.”119 
Community organizations, food policy councils, non-profit 
development groups, and labor unions also often lobby for new 
supermarkets.120  With the exception of chain retailers like Walmart 
that are perceived to unfairly compete with existing locally owned 
businesses and depress wages, supermarkets are often well-received 
by residents, the business and development communities, labor 
unions, and other stakeholders.121  For example, in New York City, 
residents of East Harlem, a predominantly low-income Latino and 
African American neighborhood, waged a multi-year advocacy 
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campaign to bring a new supermarket to the community.122  In 
response, city officials provided land at a below-market price to a 
church-based community development company, the Abyssinian 
Development Corporation, to open a Pathmark supermarket on the 
site for ten years, and as noted above, LISC provided financing.123  
Soon after the Pathmark opened, it reported 30,000 customers a 
week, and by 2014 sales totaled $64 million.124  Neighborhood 
histories might also play a role in generating demand for new 
supermarkets, emphasizing the need to address food access through 
food retail.  For example, in communities that have lost a popular 
supermarket, residents often feel a very strong need to replace it, and 
that need may be based on concerns about the community’s identity 
and its ability to thrive.125  Bringing a new supermarket to a 
community enables government officials to promise an easy, even if 
unrealistic, fix to the complex problems of poverty, community under-
investment, malnourishment, and health disparities, all of which 
require substantial and prolonged government investment. 
C. Analytical Weaknesses 
Despite the often-stated goal of evidence-based policymaking, 
programs are frequently advanced because they appeal to intuitive 
assumptions or models about consumer preferences and decision-
making that may be untested or simply wrong.126  Simple theories, 
such as that living very close to a supermarket that sells healthy food 
will cause people to buy more of that food, have intuitive appeal, and 
may win out over theories that attempt to address the complexities of 
economic decision-making, choice architectures, and the 
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interconnected social practices that drive behaviors like food 
shopping, buying, and eating.127 
By starting with the assumption that close physical proximity to 
healthy food is necessary for healthy eating, food access advocates 
have been able to ignore or dismiss studies showing that proximity 
has little to no effect on diet.128  Moreover, when studies show that an 
intervention has failed to change behavior, policymakers often seek 
to redesign the intervention (e.g., adding informational “nudges” to 
encourage shoppers to buy healthier food at the supermarket),129 
rather than questioning the underlying approach of addressing 
malnourishment through increased retail.  Researchers also tend to 
conduct studies that are feasible to carry out, resulting in the 
proliferation of research measuring easy-to-analyze variables, such as 
area studies that attempt to associate proximity between population 
centroids and food retailers.130  The proliferation of Geographic 
Information Systems (“GIS”) tools, and the relative accessibility of 
data on poverty and food retail locations, has made it easy to measure 
neighborhood-level variables, despite the fact that these studies do 
not distinguish where individual households actually shop and what 
they choose to purchase.131 
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The existence of contradictory evidence creates uncertainty, which, 
combined with diverse research methods, variable data quality, and 
different theoretical models, makes interpreting and evaluating 
research results difficult.  Understanding and properly applying the 
results can be especially challenging for legislative staff who may not 
have expertise in evaluation research methods and data analysis.  
Complexity enables policy proponents to shape the interpretation of 
those studies and couch their arguments in the language of evidence-
based public health and policymaking.  The Food Trust, for example, 
asserts that “HFFI policy and efforts to improve food access are 
rooted in more than 300 studies published between 1995 and 2013,”132 
yet without parsing these studies for reliability and validity, it is 
difficult for political decision-makers to evaluate the evidence. 
Another barrier is the persistent use by public health practitioners 
of downstream interventions (e.g., cooking classes) rather than 
upstream interventions that address economic and social disparities.  
Even approaches based on socio-ecological models often “drift 
downstream” to variables that influence individual behaviors.133  The 
notion that behaviors such as food buying, cooking, and eating result 
from choices that can be modified through environmental 
interventions like a new supermarket has an easily-grasped intuitive 
appeal that has been reinforced by the social psychology and 
behavioral economics literatures.134  These interventions also gain 
political support because they fit neoliberal ideologies, avoid 
challenging corporate business models, and sidestep the complexities 
of solving social determinants of health like structural racism or 
poverty, which have a significant effect on whether and to what extent 
people are able to eat healthy food.135  Addressing the upstream, root 
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causes of malnourishment, specifically poverty, time constraints, 
stress, and other factors, is much more complex and politically 
fraught. 
The potential consequences of the downstream focus are serious.  
If policymakers in housing, planning, economic development, or 
social welfare fail to consider the results of their “upstream” policy 
decisions on food security or chronic diseases, they may miss 
opportunities to maximize the effects of these broader progressive 
policies on population health and food system sustainability, or may 
not recognize and take steps to avoid unintended negative 
consequences to the food system.136  They may also overlook the 
potential for interventions in the food system—from universal school 
lunch to food cooperatives—to play a role in alleviating upstream 
concerns about economic and social inequality.  Intervening 
downstream to change behaviors or improve neighborhood food 
environments may narrowly benefit a particular population, but the 
effects, if any, may be more limited in scale, scope, and duration than 
if policies are focused on class, race, or gender oppression.137 
V.  UPSTREAM ALTERNATIVES 
Public health debates remain focused on downstream issues at both 
the national and local levels.138  However, over the past decade, a 
number of U.S. cities have responded to widening inequality and 
structural racism by adopting political agendas that emphasize 
equality and social justice.  They have taken steps to increase wages 
and improve working conditions, address the high cost of housing, 
provide better public services to low-income residents, and address 
structural racism.139  These interventions target macro-scale factors 
like wealth, education, social capital, and security that are the primary 
causes of negative population health outcomes.  Rather than support 
ineffective downstream interventions, policymakers, public health 
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professionals, and advocates should instead advance these upstream 
strategies that address the root causes of food insecurity and diet-
related health disparities.  The following sections offer some 
promising upstream strategies. 
A. Increasing the Minimum Wage 
The federal minimum wage, currently at $7.25, is significantly 
below the living wage, even in the poorest parts of the country.  
According to MIT’s Living Wage Calculator, which provides for a 
“low-cost” and “nutritionally adequate” diet,140 the living wage for 
Buffalo County, South Dakota—the poorest county in the nation—
was $10.11 an hour in 2016 for a single adult, while the national living 
wage was $15.84.141  The federal minimum wage is also significantly 
below its inflation-adjusted high of $11.18 in 1968 despite large 
increases in worker productivity since that time.142  The minimum 
wage would be well over $18 if it had kept pace with productivity 
increases since 1968.143  The Fight for $15 campaign and other efforts 
to increase the minimum wage have proven popular and, at least at 
the state level, effective: twenty-one states and Washington, D.C. 
have raised their minimum wages since 2014.144  A national minimum 
of $15 would raise the wages of millions of people among the working 
poor and improve their ability to procure healthy food. 
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B. Strengthening Labor Protections 
The working poor often contend with job insecurity, unpredictable 
hours, and unpaid sick leave, in addition to low wages.145  Precarious 
employment reduces workers’ ability to plan meals or shop for 
healthy food while increasing stress levels, which can lead to a 
cascade of negative dietary and health outcomes.146  Food security 
advocates should not only support stronger labor protections at the 
state and federal level, but should also campaign for federal 
legislation repealing state “right-to-work” laws that weaken workers’ 
ability to organize.  At the municipal level, policies like paid sick 
leave, enforcement against tipped wage theft, and requirements that 
employers regularize shift workers’ schedules (“fair workweek 
laws”)147 create job stability and improve the wellbeing of low-wage 
workers.  Such policies would enable these workers to better provide 
for the nutritional needs of their households. 
C. Expanding the Welfare State 
Increasing wages and protections for the working poor, while 
important, will not substantially improve the material living 
conditions of many Americans.  Around half of the United States’ 
population does not work and roughly eighty percent of the poor do 
not work.148  Additionally, the majority of the non-working 
population are members of vulnerable groups, including children, the 
elderly, and the disabled, who either cannot or should not work.149  
To ensure that the majority of the people in poverty are food secure 
and financially stable, the federal government should expand benefits 
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for people outside of the workforce, focusing on the unemployed, 
children, the elderly, the disabled, caretakers, and students.150 
D. Protecting and Expanding SNAP 
SNAP is one of the United States’ most important social programs, 
providing about forty million Americans with benefits each month in 
2017.151  To receive these benefits, individuals and households must 
be at or below the poverty line, or in some cases, no more than 
slightly above it.152  SNAP should be protected from proposals in 
Congress to reduce the program’s budget or to transform it into a 
block grant, which would result in deep cuts and make the program 
less responsive during economic downturns.153  Additionally, the 
program’s meager benefits should be increased; the average 
beneficiary only received $126 a month or $1.40 per meal in 2017.154  
A 2016 study found that raising monthly SNAP benefits by only $30 
per person would increase the consumption of healthy foods, reduce 
the consumption of fast foods, and increase food security.155 
E. Protecting and Expanding Universal Free School Lunch 
The nation’s school lunch (and breakfast) programs provide 
nutritious meals that, for low-income households, meet a large 
portion of the caloric needs of school-age children and save parents 
the cost of these meals.156  The federal community eligibility provision 
allows school districts with high percentages of students who qualify 
for free meals to serve meals free to all students in the school.157  
Ensuring that this program is not cut and encouraging more school 
districts to use the community eligibility provision to expand universal 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See id. 
 151. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO 
SNAP 1 (2017). 
 152. Id. at 3. 
 153. DOROTHY ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, BLOCK-
GRANTING SNAP WOULD ABANDON DECADES-LONG FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO 
REDUCING HUNGER 2–8 (2017). 
 154. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 151, at 3. 
 155. PATRICIA M. ANDERSON & KRISTIN F. BUTCHER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SNAP BENEFITS, GROCERY SPENDING, 
DIET QUALITY, AND THE ADEQUACY OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES’ RESOURCES 1, 3, 5–
14 (2016). 
 156. Craig Gundersen, Food Assistance Programs and Child Health, 25 FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 91, 92 (2015). 
 157. MADELEINE LEVIN & ZOË NEUBERGER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, COMMUNITY ELIGIBILITY: MAKING HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS HUNGER 
FREE 5 (2013). 
1120 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
free school lunch throughout the country would help provide free, 
healthy meals to all children and reduce the stigma associated with 
free lunch.158 
CONCLUSION 
Food policy remains dominated by a “Let Them Eat Kale” 
perspective that has emphasized subsidizing conventional food 
retailers to increase food access while shifting attention from the 
more fundamental upstream causes of malnourishment and health 
disparities: social inequality, race, gender, class oppression, and 
poverty.  These types of food access policies persist because they fit 
neoliberal and conservative ideologies that privilege market solutions 
to social problems, are politically popular by addressing justifiable 
community desires for new, full-service supermarkets, and promise a 
relatively simple fix to the complex problems of obesity, 
malnourishment, and diet-related diseases.  They are often described 
as food justice initiatives even if they do not address the underlying 
injustices of economic inequality, poverty, and oppression.  However, 
a growing body of evidence reveals that mere access does not provide 
such a fix and that eliminating diet-related health disparities requires 
moving far upstream.  Some might argue that debates over the 
effectiveness of expanding food retail may be interesting but are 
ultimately irrelevant; having a supermarket in one’s community is 
always better than none, and in the current political climate, in which 
basic support programs like SNAP are threatened, it is better to move 
forward with programs that at least improve the retail environment in 
low-income neighborhoods.  However, in creating the perception of 
change—without actually addressing inequality—downstream 
interventions like new supermarkets may diminish pressure for 
broader social change. 
The goal should be to create policies that build capital within 
communities and distribute our country’s substantial wealth more 
equitably, while providing living wages and labor standards so that 
people have time and money to provide for their needs.  These steps 
may be more difficult to achieve politically than expanding access to 
supermarkets, but only by looking beyond food can we build a society 
in which everyone has the ability to eat well.  There are no shortcuts 
to eliminating food poverty. 
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